Small, sophisticated unmanned aerial systems (“UAS”) are rapidly entering the mass-market hobbyist and commercial markets in significant numbers because nearly any amateur can pilot. This rapid growth of the consumer and commercial UAS market raises security and privacy concerns.
In at least five fires during July 2015 in California, fire aircraft dispatched to drop chemicals or water had to adjust its course due to interference with a UAS. Numerous UAS have been seen flying near major US airports such as Newark Liberty International and John F. Kennedy International Airports in the NY metro area causing serious concern for risk of a catastrophic mid-air collision.
Sep. 4, 2015, another hobbyist pilot was arrested, according to the New York Police Department, when he accidentally crashed his UAS into the Louis Armstrong Stadium, during the United States Tennis Association Open Tournament.
Yet another small UAS hobbyist in Washington D.C. accidentally crashed a UAS on the lawn of the White House.
The statutory parameters of a model aircraft operation are outlined in Section 336 of Public Law 112-95 (the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Modernization and Reform Act of 2012). Individuals who fly within the scope of these parameters do not require permission to operate their UAS; any flight outside these parameters (including any non-hobby, non-recreational operation) requires FAA authorization. An estimated 700,000-1,000,000 consumer hobbyist drones will be sold in the United States in 2015 alone.
The FAA has had more than three years to meet the Sep. 30, 2015 deadline for full integration, yet the agency has not yet completed rules defining a small unmanned aerial system (“UAS”). Prior to the finalization of the Small UAS Rule, the FAA is granting exceptions on case-by-case authorization for certain unmanned aircraft to perform commercial operations. The approved exceptions increased from eight (8) from July-December 2014 to 1724 through September 2015, indicating the number of UAS in use is increasing exponentially.
Senate Bill S. 1608, The Consumer Drone Safety Act proposed by Senators Diane Feinstein (CA-D) and Charles Schumer (NY-R) on Jun. 18, 2015 to protect the safety of the national airspace system from the hazardous operation of consumer drones, and for other purposes. Among several things, the bill calls for a technological means to maintain safety in the event that a communications link between a consumer drone and its operator is lost or compromised, such as by ensuring that the drone autonomously lands safely in a particular location. This feature is present in some of today's UAS and is commonly known as Return to Home (RTH) or Return to Launch (RTL).
Bill S. 1608 also requires that a consumer drone be detectable and identifiable to pilots and air traffic controllers, including the use of an identification number and a transponder or similar technology to convey the drone's location and altitude. The additional requirement of a means to prevent tampering with or modification of any system, limitation, or other safety mechanism required by the Administrator ensures these capabilities will be on consumer drones.
Some current systems to defend against unauthorized UAS are based on detection, determination of intent and disablement or destruction of an offending UAS. There are numerous issues with this approach, the most important being risk of injury or death as a result of collateral damage to humans and property from a disabled or destroyed drone. There are also legal questions regarding who is allowed to disable damage or destroy an offending UAS.
Some attempts focus extensively on detecting UAS presence through numerous multi-sensor methods and when detected, alerting the property owner of UAS presence, whether friendly or threatening. Generally, these solutions do not propose methods to manually or automatically prevent UAS from entering the property. Some require manual intervention for threat remediation from UAS causing the property owner to require trained staff 24×7 to protect the property.
Other current defense systems are based on “no-fly” zone coordinates loaded onto the drone firmware. These ‘no-fly zones’ can be updated constantly. It is unclear how the small drone manufacturers will keep this updated and how hobbyists will be required to update their drones. This approach will not address ‘no-fly zones’ that are temporarily set up for situations such as aerial firefighting, general emergency situations, on-location movie filming, parades or other mass audience events.
Attempts have been made to reduce the problems with UAS. For example, U.S. 2015/0254988 A1, Sep. 10, 2015, Wang et al. “Flight Control for Flight-Restricted Regions” pertains to restricted areas, unmanned vehicles and a means to determine when the unmanned vehicles are within the restricted areas. It employs the use of GPS for the UAS's location and have prestored coordinates of restricted areas. This system is for restricted areas that are loaded on the UAS. It cannot detect or determine restricted areas that have been set up since this information was last updated on the UAS. It does not have interactive capabilities to know of temporary no-fly zones as they are created and or deleted.
Also, since Wang '988 relies upon downloads, it is difficult for a system according to Wang's description to accurately identify no-fly zones which are not stationery. These may be moving no-fly zones.
The device of US 2007/0018052 A1, Jan. 25, 2007 by Eriksson “A System and Method for In-Flight Control of an Aerial Vehicle” pertains to defining the shape and location of space that is not restricted airspace. This defines locations where an UAS is allowed to fly without running into restricted air space. It does not describe system for controlling the UAS to change its course, divert it, or make it land. It also does not address that different UAS may be allowed into different no-fly zones.
U.S. Pat. No. 8,886,459 B2, Nov. 11, 2014, by Stefani et al. “Systems and Methods for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Tactical Tracking and Mission Data Acquisition” pertains to a system to manage the flight paths of small-UAS and integrate the system into the National Airspace Structure. This deals primarily with traffic control and uses methods other than broadcasting the no-fly coordinates to UAS to identify no-fly zones. Stefani does not seem capable of identifying no-fly zones that are mobile.
Currently, there is a need that restricts defined types of unmanned aerial systems from entering into defined airspace at given times/dates.